We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. a transmission network) supplying an essential input to several downstream …rms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream …rm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream …rm can perform non-tari¤ discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream …rm maximizes only own pro…ts; with imperfections it considers to some extend also the pro…ts of its downstream mother. We …nd that reducing imperfections in legal unbundling (keeping ownership …xed) generally increases total output. Increasing the incumbent's ownership share increases total output if imperfections are su¢ ciently small, otherwise the e¤ects are ambiguous. Surprisingly, higher ownership shares of the downstream incumbent may sometimes lead to lower degrees of imperfections.
Introduction
In many network industries like energy, rail, or telecommunications the network is a naturally monopoly and network access is an essential input for …rms competing in downstream markets. Monopolistic bottlenecks are also an issue in other industries, like the software industry where undiscriminating access to the functionality of an operation system is an essential input for …rms competing in the application markets.
An important question for regulatory policy is whether a …rm active in the downstream market is allowed to operate the monopolistic bottleneck or to have ownership shares in the upstream …rm that controls this bottleneck. While most academic research focuses only on the comparison between vertical integration and full ownership separation, there is an important alternative: legal unbundling.
Legal unbundling means that the monopolistic bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream …rm, but the upstream …rm may be fully or partially owned by a …rm active in the downstream market. The downstream mother is not allowed to interfere in the upstream operations, but its ownership share gives entitlement to the corresponding proportion of upstream pro…ts.
In Europe, legal unbundling is the standard requirement for the energy industry 3 , and similar forms of "partial separation"are common in the telecommunications industry in Europe and the US. 4 .
We know so far of only two papers -Hö-er and Kranz (2007) and Cremer et. al. (2006) -that perform a theoretical analysis of legal unbundling (Cremer et. al. consider, however , the reverse case where the downstream …rm is legally unbundled and owned by the upstream …rm). Both papers assume that legal unbundling is perfect in the sense that the unbundled …rm maximizes only its own pro…ts, while only the mother company maximizes joint pro…ts.
Hö-er and Kranz show that under this assumption and regulated access prices legal unbundling leads to highest output quantities in a model where the upstream …rm can hamper the operations of downstream …rms. They also show that the attractive features of legal unbundling persist when upstream investments into capacity, marginal cost reduction or network reliability are considered. receives a higher share of upstream pro…ts and therefore has smaller incentives for manipulations that reduce upstream pro…ts.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 derives the general results and illustrates why total output may fall in F 1 's ownership share when ! is high. In Section 4 we give a micro-foundation for the weight ! and examine its relation with F 1 's ownership share: Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
The model
Active …rms There is a monopolistic upstream …rm F 0 that produces a good at constant marginal costs c 0 ; which is used as input good for n competing downstream …rms, F 1 ; :::; F n : Each downstream …rm needs a constant and identical amount of the input good to create an output good. For simplicity, we normalize input quantities such that each …rm needs exactly one unit of the input good to create one unit of an output good.
Non-tari¤ discrimination We assume F 0 is a regulated natural monopoly, e.g. the owner of an essential transmission network in electricity or telecommunication markets. Access prices are regulated such that upstream pro…ts 0 are strictly increasing in total output (details are given below). We assume that F 0 can perform the operation of the network in ways that may discriminate distinct downstream …rms. Formally, F 0 chooses a discrimination (or sabotage) strategy h 2 H that in ‡uences output, costs and consumer prices of downstream …rms.
The strategy h can describe measures like disclosure of con…dential information to competitors, delay or excessive formalities when dealing with requests, or network repairs at times that are especially inconvenient for some downstream …rms.
We make the simplifying assumption that the choice of h has no direct impact on the pro…ts of output q i (x; h), their market prices p i (x; h) and their total costs C i (x; hja). Total output quantity is given by Q(h; x) = P n i=1 q i (x; h).
Pro…ts of downstream …rm
i are given by
hj ) for i = 1; :::; n
We assume that no downstream …rm can make in…nite high pro…ts or losses,
i.e. the set of possible downstream pro…ts is bounded. Furthermore the regularity condition C1 (see below) will require existence of subgame perfect equilibria.
Otherwise, there are no further restrictions on functional forms.
Access price regulation and upstream pro…ts
The parameter in downstream costs functions denotes an access price regulation scheme. We assume that the access price regulation schemes ful…lls two conditions. First, the pro…ts of F 0 shall depend only on total output Q; i.e. it does not matter which downstream …rm contributed how much to the total output Q: This is a sensible requirement, since otherwise the regulator would give the upstream …rm explicit incentives to prefer output from speci…c downstream …rms, which may cause sabotage of competitors of those …rms. Second, we require that F 0 's pro…ts are strictly increasing in total output. This also seems sensible, since there is typically a problem of underprovision of output, because of downstream market power.
Thus upstream pro…ts are given by a function
5 If …rms play mixed strategies these variables denote expected values. In that case, we assume that all …rms are risk-neutral.
that is strictly increasing in total output Q: A simple example for such a price scheme is a common linear access price a above marginal costs c 0 : Another example is that the regulator pays a linear access price above marginal costs to F 0 but charges downstream …rms a two-part tari¤ with marginal access price of c 0 plus a …xed fee. It is not necessary that downstream payments have to equal the payments the upstream …rm receives; part of the payments may also be subsidies.
Timing The price regulation scheme is exogenously given in our model. Then Ownership by downstream incumbent The downstream incumbent F 1 can own some or the complete share of the upstream …rm F 0 . We denote F 1 's ownership share by and assume that F 1 maximizes its totally received pro…ts, given by
Imperfect legal unbundling Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream …rm F 0 has an independent management, which maximizes only upstream pro…ts Regularity conditions For every pair ( ; !) our model formally consists of a multi-stage game. The timing and strategy-space of these games is the same for all ( ; !) and only the payo¤ functions for F 0 and F 1 di¤er. We call a situation a pair of ( ,!) and some history of the corresponding multi-stage game, where at least one player still has to move. To avoid technical complications that could arise if some continuation games have no subgame-perfect equilibrium, we require:
C1 In every situation there is a subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium.
Note that a given situation may have multiple subgame-perfect continuation equilibria. We also make a regularity condition on equilibrium selection for those cases:
C2 Assume two situations have an identical set of subgame-perfect continuation equilibria. Then in both situations the same subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium shall be selected from this identical set.
This regularity condition avoids tedious comparision of sets of equilibria. Note that C2 is obviously not needed when in every situation there is a unique continuation equilibrium.
We want to remark the following direct implications of our model under these regularity conditions.
Remark Under the condition above entrants equilibrium decisions only depend on h and the decision of the incumbent x 1 : This means given h …rm 1 can choose between di¤erent decision pro…les x = (x 1 ; x 2 (x 1 ; h); :::; x n (x 1 ; h)). Furthermore the incumbent's decision x 1 only depends on h and on his ownership share :
Thus the equilibrium choices in the downstream markets x can be described as a function of h and :
Results

General output results
In this Section we analyze the comparative statics of total output with respect to changes in the degree of imperfection in legal unbundling ! and F 1 's ownership share : The results are formalized in Propositions 1 and 2 and illustrated in Figure   1 .
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the direction of weakly increasing total output.
The downward oriented vertical arrows indicate that making F 0 more independent, i.e. reducing ! weakly increases output for any given ownership share of F 1 . This is formally stated in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 For every given ownership share the total output is weakly decreasing in !: 
If ! a = 0, we …nd directly from the …rst inequality 0 (h
we divide the …rst inequality by ! a and the second inequality by ! b : Adding the two resulting inequalities yields (
Since total output is strictly increasing in upstream pro…ts 0 this inequality implies that total output must be weakly higher under ! a than under ! b :
The horizontal arrows in …gure 1 have the following meaning: When F 0 acts completely independent, i.e. ! = 0; we …nd that total output is weakly increasing Optimal choice by the incumbent F 1 implies
Adding these two inequalities and dividing by ( b a ) yields:
Optimal choice by the upstream …rm F 0 implies
Combining with the previous inequality and rearranging yields
The term on the RHS equals 0 for ! = 0. Also its limit for ! ! 0 is 0, because we assumed that minimal and maximal downstream pro…ts are bounded. Since 0 only depends on total output Q and is strictly increasing in Q; this implies the proposition.
The two results imply that perfect legal unbundling with full ownership ( = 1; ! = 0) leads to a weakly higher output than every other combination of and !: Thus whenever higher total output is linked to higher welfare it would indeed be desirable to achieve such perfect legal unbundling with full ownership.
The main results are quite intuitive. Output increases when F 0 becomes more independent, since for lower ! the upstream …rm attaches a smaller weight on F 1 's downstream pro…ts and therefore a relatively bigger weight on output maximization. Similarly, when F 1 's ownership share increases, F 1 attaches greater weight on upstream pro…ts, which increase in total output. Intuitively, this should lead to an increase in total output.
Example of ambiguous e¤ects of when ! is large
Given this intuition it is somewhat surprising that there can be cases where for a given high level of ! an increase in ownership share may decrease total output.
We illustrate such a case with the following example. Assume there are two downstream …rms with constant marginal costs c 1 = 0:4 and c 2 = 0:3 who compete by setting simultaneously quantities (Cournot). 6 The inverse demand is given by There are two classes of equilibria corresponding to the areas C and M in …gure 2. Either there is no sabotage and both downstream …rms compete (area C) or we have a downstream monopoly of F 1 where the downstream competitor F 2 will be strongly sabotaged and therefore produces 0 (area M). As is intuitively clear, the monopoly outcome arises only for su¢ ciently high levels of !: Within the sets of monopoly outcomes and competitive outcomes total output is always increasing in F 1 's ownership share ; which is in line with the intuition that higher give F 1 stronger incentives to increase total output. But for high levels of ! an increase in may lead from a competitive outcome to a monopoly outcome with lower total output. The intuition is that achieving the monopoly outcome by sabotaging F 2 is more attractive for F 0 when F 1 's ownership share is high, since for higher output losses due to double marginalization are less severe. If ! is low this e¤ect does not arise because then F 0 mainly cares about high output and therefore always prefers the competitive solution. These proportional costs capture the idea that detection risk and possible punishment by the regulator are higher for manipulations that are very costly for the upstream …rm F 0 : Proportional costs are also plausible when the management of F 0 directly participates in the upstream pro…ts of via incentive contracts and therefore needs higher bribes to change decision from d 0 to d 1 whenever this reduces upstream pro…ts to a large extend.
In addition to the costs of manipulation, the downstream incumbent F 1 will also take into account that changing the decision from d 0 to d 1 reduces its share 0 of received upstream pro…ts: Considering these two kinds of costs, we …nd that manipulating the decision from d 0 to d 1 is pro…table for F 1 if and only if
Thus whenever this inequality is ful…lled, d 1 is selected instead of d 0 : It is straightforward to see that resulting behavior corresponds to the optimal decision rule for maximizing the following weighted sum of pro…ts 0 + 1 +c 1 . Hence, the actual decisions of F 0 look like F 0 maximizes u 0 = 0 + ! 1 with ! now being endogenously given by
If manipulation costs c are independent of F 1 's ownership share ; we therefore …nd that ! is strictly decreasing (!) in F 1 's ownership share : Thus higher ownership shares of the downstream incumbent cause the upstream …rm to attach less weight on the incumbent's downstream pro…ts. The intuition for this result is that with a higher ownership share the downstream incumbent takes upstream pro…ts more strongly into account and has therefore less incentives to manipulate the upstream …rm in a way that decreases total output.
It is plausible, however, that F 1 's manipulation costs c are decreasing in its ownership share . One reason is the following: Assume F 1 has not complete ownership of F 0 ; but there is also an independent outside investor that holds shares in F 0 and has no stakes in …rms that operate downstream. Since such an outside investor participates only in the upstream pro…ts 0 ; he has incentives to e¤ectively control that the management of F 0 does indeed maximize 0 and is not manipulated by the downstream incumbent: If is lower, then outside investors have higher ownership shares, control should be tougher and therefore manipulation costs for F 1 should be higher than for higher levels of . In result, if c is decreasing in , the total e¤ect of a change in on the weight ! becomes ambiguous.
It is perceivable that outside investors already have su¢ cient interests to control F 0 's management for a substantial minority share, like 20% ownership in F 0
and that higher shares of outside ownership do not increase control e¤ort much.
Assuming that control costs are continuously decreasing in and strictly concave i.e. c 0 ( ) < 0 and c 00 ( ) < 0 may therefore not be a bad approximation. Under this assumption we …nd Considering the results from Section 3, we should note that the ownership fraction that minimizes the weight ! that F 0 attaches on downstream pro…ts 1 is in general not that ownership fraction that maximizes total output. If the minimal level of ! is su¢ ciently small, increasing will weakly increase total output and therefore the level of that maximizes total output is likely above : If the minimal level of ! is quite high, it may, however, be the case that total output is maximized for ownership shares below :
Summary
We analyzed imperfect legal unbundling of a monopolistic provider of a bottleneck input. The upstream monopoly is price regulated and fully or partially owned by an incumbent active in the downstream markets. While under perfect legal unbundling the upstream monopolist maximizes only its own pro…ts, under imperfect legal unbundling the upstream …rm can be manipulated by the incumbent and then attaches a positive weight to the incumbent's downstream pro…ts. For every given ownership share of the downstream incumbent we …nd that total output weakly increases when manipulation is made more di¢ cult by stronger regulatory requirements. If regulation is su¢ ciently strong, such that the upstream …rm attaches only a small weight to the incumbent's downstream pro…ts, total output also weakly increases in the incumbent's ownership share. If regulation is weak the e¤ect of incumbent's ownership share on total output can be ambiguous, however. Furthermore, we show that the incumbent's ownership share also has ambiguous e¤ects on the weight that the upstream …rm attaches to the incumbent's downstream pro…ts.
We show that total output can be maximized under legal unbundling with partial ownership by the incumbent and an additional independent outside investor in the upstream …rm. Since typically consumer surplus increases in total output, our analysis suggest that these arrangements may be optimal for consumers.
